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Abstract 
Introducing a ‘complexity ethics' frame would help society mitigate or adapt to climate 
warming within or exceeding the Paris Agreement 1.5°C aim. A complexity ethics frame 
underlines existing facilitative multi-stakeholder methodologies used at subnational scales to 
build adaptive capacity and may be scaled-up in a transformed UNFCCC. Adopting such 
approaches at the international political level would permit non-state, non-Party stakeholders 
to more efficiently integrate their tremendous capacity for climate action into the global 
climate action process, leading to more substantial climate mitigation and adaptation for and 
over 1.5°C warming. In turn, this would help satisfy critiques regarding the democratic 
legitimacy of polycentric moves to include non-state actors at this level, incorporate other 
global initiatives and problems like the SDGs and biodiversity loss, and meet high-level calls 
for more co-operative responses.
INTRODUCTION
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas accumulation has moved the earth into a climate regime thought 
to be unseen in 60 million years [1], that left unchecked could produce climate regimes 
unknown in at least the past 420 million years and likely to be cataclysmal for the current 
assemblage of life on Earth [2*]. Thus, the politically negotiated but scientifically informed 
Paris Agreement aims to limit global average temperature increase to (preferably) under 1.5°C 
but (certainly) under 2.0°C warming above pre-industrial times to avoid the dangerous impacts 
of climate change [3]. Projections point toward a global average temperature rise of 2.7 to 
5.2°C above pre-industrial norms by 2100 [2,3]. Furthermore, the 1.5°C mark may be passed 
as soon as 2026 [3] even without the shortfall in agreed Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC) for emissions reduction [4–7]. Poorly mitigated climate change may also exceed 
temperature-related human habitability or survivability in some Earth regions [8–11*]. Nor do 
climate change estimates directly factor other anthropogenic perils from mass extinction-level 
biodiversity loss, population and food security, and technological change [12-14,15*–17]. 
However, despite such ominous analyses, little action has been taken at the global political 
level to adapt to the stark possibility of a climate over 1.5 or 2.0°C [18]. The international 
community might, therefore, be said to be gambling on the success of Paris Agreement with 
no alternative ‘plan B’ for high-end warming. However, at more local scales, substantive action 
has been taken through participatory adaptive capacity and resilience building to respond to a 
range of climate scenarios [19**,20**]. An urgent need thus exists to push new ideas, even if 
incomplete, that could prepare humanity for a range of long-term climate futures.
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2In this spirit, this paper argues that this last-minute high-stakes wager on the social-ecological 
future of humanity by governing institutions through the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process reflects a classical and erroneous 
assumption that reality comprises linear cause and effect relationships, and that politics-as-
usual can control it. Operationalising a complexity ethics in the UNFCCC’s structures and 
procedures to adopt facilitative decision-making methods and processes used in adaptive 
capacity building in sub-global contexts is proposed as a remedy. This would better mobilise 
state and non-state stakeholders for more effective climate action. It would also do much to 
resolve the ontological mismatch between complexity science and climate governance by 
reflecting in institutional procedures the general scientific position that reality is a complex, 
adaptive, dynamic system defined by non-linear interactions between elements. Doing so may 
institutionalise a practical ethics for global transformation in amenable to both meeting and 
exceeding 1.5°C climate change, which has yet to be fully addressed in the transformations 
literature [21**]. 
SIMPLE AND COMPLEX ONTOLOGIES AND ETHICS
Ontology refers to the objects or things that comprise a given understanding of reality and the 
nature of the relationships between those things [22,23]. Complexity science has grown in 
range and scope since the 1940s [24,25] and broadly holds that reality is a complex, dynamic, 
non-linear set of interactions between the elements of reality, humans and nonhumans, or the 
things that comprise them, and emergent in form and function. These complex interactions 
cannot be fully understood or predicted, remaining pregnant with potential and uncertainty. In 
the ecological sciences, research efforts have focused on complexity dynamics in ecosystems 
that began the 1970s [26]. They include the now common-place social-ecological systems 
approach that underpins much research on resilience and adaptation to climate change 
[19,23,25,27,28]. The social sciences also contain numerous articulations of society’s 
intricacies, framed for example as, ‘complex adaptive system’ [29]; assemblages [30,31]; 
actor-networks and modes of existence [32,33]; posthumanism [34]; and via Indigenous 
knowledge systems [35]. Political ecology [36–38] includes polycentric governance of the 
environmental commons [39,40] and process-oriented approaches also appear in the 
humanities [41,42]. Emerging research is drawing on quantum theory to explain or explore 
social phenomena [43–45]. Indeed, the body of climate science that produces the evidence and 
projections of anthropogenic warming is an epistemological articulation of a basic complex, 
dynamic systems ontology.
However, the prevailing, or classical, ontology governing the much of 20th century and present-
day politics, including UNFCCC climate negotiations, rests on the assumption that reality is 
constituted by linear relationships between material objects that are predictable in relationship, 
hierarchically arranged, and discretely observable and measurable [44,46]. This classical 
understanding of reality grew out of 18th and 19th century Western intellectual thought (e.g. 
Hobbes, Smith, Marx, and others) [44], and provides the philosophical roots of current political 
ideas and institutions, and their decision-making rules and processes. These institutions include 
forms of government understood through normative frames such as left and right, liberal or 
conservative, representative or authoritarian, etc. [38]. Institutions built on classical ideas may 
be understood as dualistic [47] or “simple systems” [40] and are the common denominator of 
virtually all guises of contemporary national or global politics. This arrangement presumes a 
governing authority can control reality or events through normative (and often ideological 
3channels) of silo’d policy-making, treaties, laws, markets, goal-setting and the other forms of 
top-down, reductionist direction-finding, problem-solving, or resource distribution strategies 
that define relationships, or social contracts, between the public, private, non-government, and 
government spheres [38,48,49]. 
 
The processes and stakeholders used to negotiate the Paris Agreement 1.5°C aim - states 
themselves through the UNFCCC - are methodological manifestations of this linear ontological 
reasoning [21], which works as follows:
A global climate agreement, founded on science, and negotiated by representatives 
acting for self-interested states, will mobilise society’s actors to meet quantified 
mitigation targets to keep warming below a 1.5 – 2.0°C increase. 
  
Drawing on social complexity theorist Luhmann [51]1, Valentinov [52**] in a discussion of 
complexity ethics, describes this logic as the “goal-rationality” of “a system-complexity 
reduction strategy of settling upon a course of action…and picking out its desired effects.” As 
such, it is indicative of a linear, reductionist ontological position at odds with the complexity-
based understanding of reality. However, a complex system by its nature is irreducible and 
such reductionism excludes the prospect that the goal may be unachievable within the 
constraints of the system, requiring open-ended knowledge production and mobilisation 
methods that incorporate diverse actors and uncertainty [21,57].
COMPLEXITY ETHICS FOR A COMPLEX REALITY
Society’s ethics, or system of moral communication, refers to the values and norms that govern 
communication in society and are created to solve the problems of the time through the 
dominant lenses and values of the time [58]. Changes in ethics, values and norms at a societal 
level happen slowly, either organically through reflection and change or necessity [55]. For 
example, when powerful state-interests combined with weapons of mass destruction made war 
a catastrophic danger, a venue of state dialogue – the United Nations - was created to avoid it 
[59]. The nuclear change in worldview that made direct great-power military conflict 
unpalatable to the world community was a marked shift from the societal and elite values that 
had led to war until 1945. Other examples of shifts in moral communication include the advent 
of inclusive LGTBQ marriage laws and, the end of apartheid and other forms of 
institutionalised discrimination as social perspectives and new knowledge transformed 
people’s attitudes and institutions.
In the classical understanding of reality, moral communication is framed by ideas of 
“responsibility, respect, or contempt” mediated by “economy, law, and politics” held by self-
interested actors (e.g. individuals, groups, businesses or states) [33,52]. This system of moral 
1 Luhmann’s approach to complexity emphasises that social subsystems each perform their 
own differentiated and stratified roles, via communicative modes that drive the operation of 
the overall system [51]. While Luhmann features in Valentinov’s complexity ethics [52], 
critics argue that his functionalist approach lacks a reconciliation of emergence and 
structure/agency/environment interactions [53,54]. The argument for polycentricism and 
facilitative methods in this paper is a deviation from Luhmann as it addresses social(-
ecological) complexity through collective reflexivity and learning (e.g. [53,55,56]), opening a 
door to further theoretical development of complexity ethics. 
4communication reflects the classical, individualistic ‘goal-rationalising’ reductionist ontology 
described earlier, and is therefore potentially ontologically incompatible with complexity-
based ontology and complexity-rooted problems like climate change [25,52]. This form of 
‘methodologically nationalist’ [60] moral communication is used by states through the 
UNFCCC COP (Conference of the Parties) process to address climate change. It appears in the 
state-vs-state positioning and operational concepts such as Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) central to COP negotiations and the 
Paris Agreement. CBDR-RC distinguishes countries as more less more responsible for, able, 
and obligated to address climate change based on historical and contemporary development 
patterns and related national capacities, and greenhouse gas emissions levels [61*,62]. Here, 
poorer countries can maintain development pathways aimed at poverty and inequality 
reduction, while avoiding the constraints of more radical obligations to mitigate climate change 
[62]. Thus, the moral communication of the Paris Agreement, achieved by rigorous deliberative 
negotiation, values both the rights of states to develop and their relative capabilities to limit 
climate change to 1.5 or 2.0°C. However, given NDC shortfalls, it is far from clear whether 
this is an effective strategy to rapidly mitigate warming, which is directly dependent on rapid 
decarbonisation and contentiously on social equity and development [63]. Responsibility for 
mitigation under CBDR-RC is relegated to states to pursue through NDCs which, as 
mentioned, so far appear unlikely to meet Paris objectives. 
At the same time, however, the Paris Agreement and UNFCCC are beginning to emphasise a 
more polycentric approach to climate governance [64] that aims to better incorporate the 
actions and capacities of non-state actors in global climate action [65*]. Local governments, 
businesses, financial institutions, charities, youth, Indigenous and grassroots groups, and 
private citizens engaging in climate action already act as part of the system and thus have an 
interest in mobilising their tremendous potential to address global warming [66–68]. The 
visible results from fossil fuel divestment initiatives and local governments, for example, 
demonstrate impactful, system-level, non-state international cooperation toward 
decarbonisation [69,70]. Yet, despite proactive formal efforts to include non-state stakeholders, 
their participation remains relegated to the classically structured “technical process of the 
UNFCCC” [65], under the authority of official state Parties. The facilitated Talanoa dialogue 
for introduced by the COP 23 Fijian presidency for 2018, is a step away from this classical 
approach, but remains a limited progress assessment toward Paris Agreement decarbonisation 
via NDCs, outside UNFCCC decision-making [71]. Thus, despite changes to incorporate non-
state efforts in the UNFCCC, calls continue to be made for the more robust inclusion of non-
state forces [72,73] in effective and democratically legitimate ways [65,74**]. 
Taking into account this state of affairs, complexity ethics, ontologically congruent with 
complexity science, repositions moral communication away from classical ideas of actor 
responsibility to the system-level, recognising the inherent dynamic relationality and 
uncertainty within complex systems [52,75]. Responsibility in complexity ethics cannot be 
reduced to individual or self-interested agents, as all individual agents are parts of the system, 
therefore co-dependent, as non-linearity and uncertainty means that disturbances or actor 
behaviour has the potential to impact any other actor in anticipated and unforeseen ways 
[52,75]. In this sense, system-level forms of moral communication are in-line with individual 
self-interest as there is both collective and individual benefit for maintaining system functions 
(i.e. it understands the ethics as an all-for-one-one-for-all “win-win” game) for different actors 
or entities [52]. As such, complexity ethics may provide a philosophical basis for more 
effectively mobilising the diversity of local and global actors for action on 1.5°C climate 
change.
5HARNESSING DIVERSE LOCAL AND GLOBAL ACTORS 
Complexity ethics’ recognition of the system-level allows consideration and engagement with 
system actors other than states in climate action where these actors to take responsibility for 
each other as well themselves, mindful of the co-dependencies that a systems perspective 
reveals. The driving motivation behind these kinds of efforts is the need for a collective 
response to an unprecedented global problem irrespective of whether national governments 
consider meaningful climate action within state interests (with resulting shortfalls of NDCs) 
[76]. A complexity-based approach to 1.5°C climate change at the UNFCCC would expand 
current efforts (e.g. Talanoa), to incorporate non-state actors in the UNFCCC process toward 
a technical transformation that concentrates much less on the classical dualism of differentiated 
responsibility and takes advantage of the state of knowledge in collective multi-stakeholder 
action processes for climate adaptation.
The annual COP meetings use a highly structured procedural decision-making model. The 
UNFCCC document FCCC/CP/1996/2 contains the 59 rules detailing the linear, procedural 
vote-based method by which the international community reaches agreement on climate 
matters [77]. While it is consensus-based, consensus here refers to classical decision-making 
positions for COP deliberation adopted by national elites (via appointed negotiators), who may 
be from representative or autocratic states [78]. A weakness of this system is that it allows the 
self-interest of powerful governments or national elites to trump those of others, creating a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ for the climate challenge [79]. A further weakness, yet potential 
opportunity, especially for the principle of complexity ethics, is that while this system 
incorporates non-state and sub-state actors, guidance for climate action (e.g. the 1.5°C, IPCC 
Assessment Reports) still flows hierarchically from state governments and international 
agreements to other non- or substate actors, to mixed effect [21,70,74]. Nonetheless, this 
movement toward polycentric climate governance [64] may reflect climate change as a 
stimulus for “new understandings of the nation and the state, and international and inter-urban 
cooperation” [60].
This set-up presents the odd situation of two slightly overlapping spheres of climate action, 
state-level and non-state, that are only indirectly reconciled in global climate decision-making 
[65,73]. However, it is only the state sphere that has the added dimension of directly including 
climate science through the IPCC report process and the significant capacity for coercive legal 
and practical direction and action that states embody [80]. For example, Second World War 
cooperation between states and the direct enlistment of non-state industry and society towards 
the war effort might be read as an effective rapid mobilisation of directed polycentric efforts 
toward a global crisis. Present efforts at integrating these the state and non-state forces toward 
climate action are unlike this wartime norm and remain fragmented and indirect as the 
UNFCCC recognises non-state actors through various fora outside formal action and 
commitment [71,73]. 
ADAPTIVELY TRANSFORMING UNFCCC PROCESSES FOR COMPLEXITY 
GOVERNANCE
As others have discussed, matching governance regimes to complexity-rooted problems or 
reality is difficult and may necessitate a view that government is an enabling or facilitative 
6body, rather than a controlling authority [25,38]. For the UNFCCC, the move to incorporate 
non-state actors is a noted shift from regulation to facilitation [65], but there are still calls for 
better approaches to climate decision and action with these actors [72,73]. A possible solution 
pathway is to structurally transform the UNFCCC into a facilitative “transformative boundary 
organisation” to harness knowledge, action, and stakeholder networks for action [21]. This 
approach would draw on the extensive science and practice of group decision and negotiation 
[81,82] and participatory adaptive capacity building and mainstreaming for climate change 
[83–88] to directly capture both complexity and non-state actors. These methods take different 
forms (e.g. facilitated stakeholder workshops, scenario planning, conflict resolution methods, 
online venues) and are wide-spread in the action research and practice communities 
[20,84,87,89,90]. These methods are congruent with complexity ethics in that they 
ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically embrace social-ecological complexity, 
climate science and uncertainty, and social learning through stakeholder participation and 
learning processes [20]. Rooted in a complexity ontology (e.g. social-ecological systems 
thinking) they are the state-of-the-art for future-oriented decision-making for multiple 
stakeholders in environmental adaptation and management contexts [83–87]. Crucially, when 
applied to sustainability problems, the stakeholder cooperation inherent in these methods 
embraces emergence and nonlinear group dynamics to avoid the traps of classical or dualistic 
approaches and produce novel solutions, viewpoints, and opportunities through social learning 
that may reduce the danger of maladaptation [20,21,47,91–93]. However, while these methods 
prominently feature in climate change adaptive capacity building, their application occurs 
sectorally or locally outside of the classically-oriented state arena of the UNFCCC 
[20,84,87,89]. The cases described in this issue [19]** provide examples of the benefits of 
stakeholder-based participatory approaches to 1.5°C climate change in different contexts. As 
such, these methods offer a credible alternative to the classical UNFCCC decision-making 
process of climate change emissions reduction goals, self-interest dominated decision 
processes, and win-lose approaches.
By combining systems-level focus of complexity ethics and with the empirically well-
established methodological knowledge of facilitated multi-stakeholder processes, an 
ontologically coherent vision emerges of a transformed global institutional process for climate 
action toward mitigation for both the 1.5°C aim and adaptation to high-end climate change. 
This moves away from the goal-oriented constraint of the 1.5 – 2.0°C aims, which leaves no 
contingency for missing this urgent objective2. Instead, crucially, scaling up facilitative 
adaptive capacity building methods to the global institutional level creates a process-oriented 
multi-stakeholder/sector global mechanism that: (1) accommodates much greater potential for 
action by, (2) directly incorporating the widest array of stakeholders who can then, (3) explore 
actions under the diverse range of climate scenarios. This is critically important as high-end 
climate change raises serious survivability and habitability questions for humanity that may 
existentially challenge the states whose governments are the dominant actors in global action 
to climate change [8–11]. Such a move would help breaking-down or bypass the (possibly 
obstructive) historical, geographical and political divisions, and knowledge barriers that define 
the current UNFCCC process.
Embracing participatory adaptive capacity building at the UNFCCC level may also meet calls 
for more effective collective action across state and non-state actors [65,74] in a way that 
2 Minimally, even an argument for goal-setting as an innovation toward sustainability (via the 
Sustainable Development Goals) also suggests it requires or ought to produce more flexible 
forms of governance [94].
7accommodates scenarios for both meeting or exceeding 1.5°C warming 1.5°C, help to satisfy 
questions of democratic legitimacy [74], and compensate for state governments of reduced 
capability [61]. Moreover, it could offset the prospect of nationalist withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement and other forms of global fragmentation [76,95], by introducing multiple channels 
of communication and action between a broader diversity of highly capable actors and their 
ideas. For example, the capacities of Elon Musk’s organisations to supply energy needs at very 
large regional scales (South Australia, Puerto Rico) might overcome shortfalls in government 
in climate disadvantaged states.
However, applying a facilitative adaptive polycentric approach at the UNFCCC political level 
would likely require some experimentation in methods for that scale. Thi Hong Phuong et al. 
[20], in a systematic review of social learning and adaptive capacity scholarship may provide 
some ready insight into how to do this. They identify strengths and weakness between 
approaches toward social learning and adaptive capacity that are either hybrid or stress social 
learning or adaptive capacity. Focusing on applications to communities in high, and 
low/middle-income country blocs (i.e. COP members), Thi Hong Phuong et al. find hybrid 
approaches are particularly suited to creating,
“‘generative plurality’: people with different backgrounds from different levels come 
together in a friendly environment where they respect each other and can reach a 
consensus with confidence about the co-created solutions for carrying out adaptation 
activities.”[20]  
Such a methodological guide applied at the UNFCCC/COP level (given structural inequalities 
between states) would build on the spirit of the Talanoa dialogue [71] to bring to action high-
level calls for a “new culture of global cooperation, substantiated by mutual respect and 
support, to make the transformation towards sustainability a reality” involving state and non-
state actors to meet Paris Agreement goals [96].  
Thus, a complexity-based, participatory adaptive capacity oriented logic statement for a future 
UNFCCC climate agreement and action process might read as follows:
A global climate decision-making process directly incorporating state, substate, and 
non-state stakeholders, will co-create mitigative and adaptive responses to climate 
change under scientifically-informed scenarios of both meeting and exceeding 1.5°C 
warming in the near and long-term.
 
Moreover, the open-ended nature of this approach also allows other issues, such as biodiversity 
loss and technological advances mentioned earlier, to factor into climate action. It at least 
seems possible to imagine an eclectic mix of scientists, civil servants, private and NGO sector 
actors, indigenous representatives, youth, and others gathered around real or figurative tables 
with flip-chart paper and markers sharing knowledge and insight to devise concrete actions 
around a range of climate mitigation and adaptation scenarios. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued for a conceptual move from the classical ethical framework that guides 
the UNFCCC process toward a complexity ethics model that features a system-level focus on 
moral communication. Importantly, this would allow ethical considerations around climate 
8change to shift in step with an uncertain and changing complex ecological, social, and 
technological environment. Doing so brings the methods used for global climate action through 
the UNFCCC process into ontological alignment with the complexity-rooted understandings 
of reality now described across the sciences, humanities, and social sciences. To turn this 
conceptual frame to action, the use of facilitative methods and organisational procedures and 
structures for collective decision-making in a transformed UNFCCC process can more directly 
include non-state actors or stakeholders in impactful global climate action. This flexible 
approach, mindful of human needs and embracing participation, would help avoid the risk of 
ethical relativism and overcome power differentials. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to suggest the precise technical form of a transformed UNFCCC processes, the case for 
ontological congruence may provide a grounding for such measures. The stakeholder learning 
and action process (rather than goal) focus of facilitative methods, in turn, has the potential to 
increase the coordination of very rapid action for both 1.5°C and high-end scenarios. This is 
especially important as the adaptive capacity of some states may significantly or 
catastrophically weaken under +2.0°C climate scenarios, requiring a global ‘plan B’ for climate 
action. 
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